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American Conflicts Scholarship and
the New Law Merchant
FriedrichK. Juenger'
ABSTRACT

Professor Juenger argues that both the unilateralistand
the multilateralistschools of thought share a fixation on the
idea that law must emanate from the power of a sovereign
state. The author points out that such a view of law is
ahistoric; that, in the past, merchants relied on a substantive
body of supranational rules that transcended national
borders. This Article discusses the contemporary significance
of the law merchant for law professors, law students, and
practitioners.
The author explains how the practices of contemporary
transnationalcommercial enterprises, as well as the opinions
of contemporary scholars, support the idea that there is a
substantive body of law, a new law merchant, that does not
derivefrom sovereign states. The prevalence of arbitrationas
a means of dispute resolution buttresses this view, as do
business customs and private codifications.
The authorsuggests that conflicts professors are wont to
ignore the new law merchant in their teachings, in part
because it threatens the very existence of their subject. The
fact that private parties can emancipate their transactions
from state and national law undermines the foundation on
which choice-of-law theories rest. Moreover, the author
argues that the new law merchant threatens theoreticians
because it offers qualitatively superior solutions to
transnationalproblems. Professor Juenger maintains that
making room for the new law merchant in conflicts classes
holds forth not only a threat but also a promise: it will benefit
students and improve conflicts scholarship.

*

Edward J. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California at

Davis.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For over thirty years, the United States has been in the
throes of a "conflicts revolution,"1 whose most extreme
manifestation is the forum-centered unilateralism advocated by
Brainerd Currie. 2 Whereas the judiciary-although it does use
the unilateralist vocabulary of "interests" and "policies"--seems to
prefer the Second Restatement's 3 eclectic approach, 4 Currie's
teachings have captured the scholars' fancy.5 Some believe that
his work caused a "Copernican revolution" 6 that transformed the
U.S.
conflicts scene,
substituting
instrumentalism
for
conceptualism as the tool to resolve the problem of how to select
the law governing interstate and international transactions.
Disagreeing with Currie on various specifics, 7 most modern

U.S. conflicts writers are nevertheless convinced that choice-oflaw problems call for a process of construction and interpretation,
which would deduce the spatial purport of rules of decision from

1.
Concerning this reorientation of American conflicts law, see generally
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 92-128 (1993).
2.
See id.at 98-103, 131-39.
3.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOF LAWS (1971).
4.
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical
Study, 49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 357, 370-73 (1992).
5.
See Stewart E. Sterk, The MarginalRelevance of Choice of Law Theory,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 956 (1994).
6.
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 927, 933 (1975).
7.
See Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest
Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 104-05, 108-16 (1989-II); Bruce Posnak,
Choice of Law-Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get It, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1121,
1122-23, 1130-31 (1994).
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their underlying policies and from the interests states are said to
have in the vindication of these policies. 8 By now, the classical
multilateralist approach that Joseph Beale 9 advocated and
codified in the First Restatement 1 0 is largely considered pass6, the
detritus of an earlier formalistic and unenlightened era.1 1

I.

MULTILATERALIST AND UNILATERALIST APPROACHES:

BIRDs OF A FEATHER
The scholars' jubilation about the progress in conflict of laws
theory from a mechanical approach to an instrumental one tends
to obscure an important truth, namely that Beale and Currie are,
in a sense, birds of a feather. Although they differ in a variety of
ways, the starting point of reasoning for both multilateralists and
unilateralists is the assumption that the notion of sovereignty is

fundamental to the law of multistate transactions. 12 To be sure,
multilateralists do not look at sovereignty in the same way as
unilateralists.
The vested rights doctrine, which Beale
embraced,' 3 was invented to deal with the question-so puzzling
to legal positivists-why a court, sworn to uphold the forum's
laws and constitution, may apply foreign law. This dubious
doctrine simply skirts the question by asserting that courts do not
really apply foreign law but merely enforce rights that previously
vested in some alien territory.14
Whereas the vested rights proponents looked at sovereignty
as an obstacle to be overcome, Currie purported to derive
solutions to choice-of-law problems by deferring to governmental
prerogatives; that is, by enforcing laws in accordance with the
sovereign's presumed intentions.
Anthropomorphizing i s and
psychoanalyzing' 6 states to divine their desires, he set out to

8.
See, e.g., ROBERTA. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES 37-38 (1989); RUSSELL
J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 281-84 (3d ed. 1986).
9.
See 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1967-75
(1935).
10.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
11.
See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 2-4, 280-81, 326-27; Posnak,
supranote 7, at 1161-64.
12.
Compare 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6, 16,
43, 53, 60 (1935) with BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 123, 124, 138, 178-79, 182, 190 (1963). See JUENGER, supra note 1, at
159-60.
13.
See 3 BEALE, supranote 9, at 1974.
14.
See 1 BEALE, supranote 12, at 53.
15.
See CURRIE, supra note 12, at 53, 89, 94, 112, 447, 489, 717
(attributing to states such human characteristics as selfishness and altruism).
16.
See, e.g., id. at 85, 445, 446, 704.

490

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:487

vindicate their governmental interests. 17 His devotion to the
sovereign's wishes, as well as his prescription to resolve "true
conflicts" in the forum state's favor,1 8 illustrates that Currie's
mind-set was even more scrupulously positivistic than Beale's
framework. Indeed, that mind-set caused Currie to take extreme
positions, such as calling judges "undemocratic" for adjudicating
multistate disputes in the multilateralist tradition. 19
The manifold differences between multilateralist and
unilateralist thinking tend to distract attention from the basic
assumption the two traditional schools of thought have in
common: both postulate that transactions that cross territorial
boundaries must be governed by the laws laid down by a state or
nation; neither countenances legal rules that are not rooted in
some sovereign's command. In other words, unilateralists and
multilateralists concur in rejecting, with Justice Holmes, the idea
of a "transcendental body of law outside of any particular State..
. ."2o Like Holmes, they believe that "law in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it"2 1 and that "the authority and only authority
is the State .. ."22
III. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND THE LEX MERCATORIA
The assumption that rules and institutions cannot be called
"law" unless they emanate from a sovereign is, of course,
thoroughly ahistoric. Long before Jean Bodin promoted the
notion of sovereignty2 3 and John Austin espoused legal
positivism,2 4 there was law.

In dealing with the "international"

transactions of yore, decision-makers relied on rules they thought
to be transcendental in nature. Thus, to adjudicate the legal
relationships with and between non-Romans, the praetor
25
peregrinus developed a ius gentium of universal purport.
Similarly, medieval commercial tribunals applied a universal law

17.
See, e.g., i. at 81-82, 116, 189,446, 525, 592, 704.
See id. at 117-20 and passin.
18.
See id. at 124, 179, 182.
19.
20.
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
21.
Id. at 535.
22.
23.
See JEAN BODIN, SIX LIVRES DE LA RPUBLIQUE (Scientia Aalen 1961) 911 (1576); PRESTON KING, THEIDEOLOGYOF ORDER 73-84, 126-57 (1974).
24.
See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1885); JOSEPH
RAZ, THE CONCEPTOFALEGAL SYSrEM 5-7 (2d ed. 1980).
See JUENGER, supranote 1, at 8-9.
25.
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merchant to deal with the legal problems caused by a burgeoning
commerce that did not respect the borders drawn by feudal
lords. 2 6 The English admiralty courts relied on the best available
sources, be they domestic or foreign, in elaborating what was to
become a worldwide maritime law. 2 7 In other words, the original
approach to what are now considered choice-of-law problems was
neither unilateralist nor multilateralist, but rather substantive in

nature.
As nation-states emerged, however, the idea of a universal
law collided head-on with notions of legal positivism, an ideology
implicit in the national commercial law codifications that
These
encroached upon the supranational lex mercatoria.28
29
notions became the nineteenth century's conventional wisdom.
However, even during the heyday of fervent nationalism, the
Dutch scholar Josephus Jitta called for an overarching
substantive law that, instead of subjecting international
transactions to what he called the "conflicts guillotine,"3 0 would
free them from the vagaries of national legislation.
Josephus Jitta's call has since been echoed by a growing
number of legal writers.
Arguing that no domestic law is

adequate to cope with the exigencies of international commerce,
the Uruguayan conflicts scholar Quintin Alfonsin hypothesized an
More recently, the
"international private law" of contracts.3 1
French comparativist Rend David took the position that frequently

"justice requires that there be different rules for internal and for
international trade."3 2 He scathingly remarked:
[T]he lawyer's idea which aspires to submit international trade, in
every case, to one or more national systems of law is nothing but
bluff. The practical men have very largely freed themselves from it,
by means of standard contracts and arbitration, and states will be
abandoning neither sovereignty nor prerogatives if they open their

26.
See id. at 16, 23-24.
27.
See id. at 23-24, 165.
THE EVOLUTION OF
28.
See LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT:
COMMERCIAL LAW 24-25 (1983).
29.
See MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67 (1961); Friedrich K. Juenger, Remarks,
79 PROC. Am. SOCY'INTrL. 353, 354 (1985).
30.
See DANIEL JOSEPHUS JrlTA, LA METHODE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVP,
44 (1890). See also id. at 50, 132, 221.
See QUINN ALFONSIN, TEORIA DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 4631.
47 (1955); QUINMIN ALFONSIN, REGIMEN INTERNACIONAL DE LOS CONTRATOS 24, 53, 61,
85-86 (1950).
Ren6 David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTL
32.
ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L., ch. 5, at 11 (1971).
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eyes to reality and
lend themselves to the reconstruction of
33
international law.

As David suggests, enterprises engaged in international business
manage to keep commercial disputes out of the courts and
beyond the reach of unsatisfactory local rules. Their practices
impugn the postulate that there can be no law in this world other
than that ordained by a sovereign.

IV. THE LAW ARBITRATORS APPLY

The business community's large-scale recourse to arbitration
effectively takes international commercial disputes out of state
and national courtrooms, which poses the question whether the
law applicable to these disputes should not also be
denationalized. As the United States Supreme Court stated, "the
international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal
norms of particular states."3 4 Arbitral panels-whose members
hale from different countries and which sit in places that may
have no contacts whatsoever with the cases they adjudicate-are
not inclined to "look at the world through national glasses."35
Awareness of their role as international decision-makers is bound
to affect the arbitrators' selection of the rules of decision they
apply to the disputes that come before them.
From the arbitrators' vantage point, the positivistic
arguments multilateralists and unilateralists alike have advanced
against party autonomy, 36 for instance, look ludicrous. After all,
arbitrators owe their very jobs to the individuals or enterprises
who appointed them. If private parties can select the decisionmaker, how could that decision-maker question their power to
specify the rules he is to apply to the controversy they submitted
to him? And if participants in international commerce have the
authority to stipulate the law they wish to govern in the event of
arbitration, why should that authority be lacking if they submit
their disputes to a court of law rather than a non-judicial panel?
No argument founded on reason, as opposed to what parades as

33.

Id. at 212. See also Robert D. Cooter, StructuralAdjudication and the

New Law Merchant: A Model of DecentralizedLaw, 14 IN'rL REV. L. & ECON. 215
(1994).
34.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 636 (1985).
35.

FELIX DASSER, INTERNATIONALE SCHIEDSGERICHTE UND LEX MERCATORIA 26

(1989).
36.
Compare 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 107980 (1935) with Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 75-76 (1989).
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political science, can explain why party autonomy should be
objectionable.
But what if the parties to an international transaction failed
to avail themselves of their power to stipulate the applicable law
and there is no positive international body of rules, such as the
International Sale of Goods Convention, to govern the dispute?
Obviously, arbitral panels enjoy ample discretion to pick and
choose appropriate rules of decision. 3 7 Even if the arbitrators feel
bound to apply some positive choice-of-law rules-presumably not

those of the lex fori, for there really is no "forum state'"-the
proper law approach that prevails in many parts3 s is sufficiently
pliable and result-oriented to permit them to select any one of the
laws with which the transaction they adjudicate has some
plausible contact.
Moreover, provisions such as the second
sentence of Article 13(3) of the International Chamber of
Commerce Arbitration Rules further broaden this discretionary
margin by allowing arbitrators to pick whatever choice-of-law rule
39
they wish.
Other enactments go even farther. For example, the French
Civil Procedure Code provides as follows:
The arbitrator shall decide the dispute in accordance with the rules
of law the parties have chosen; in the absence of such a choice, in
He shall,
accordance with those which he considers appropriate.
4 °
in all cases, take into account commercial customs.

This provision, and similar ones in the Mexican Commercial
Code 4 ' and in the second sentence of Article 29(1) of the
American Arbitration Association's International Arbitration
Rules, confers upon arbitrators the widest possible discretion. It

37.

See David, supra note 32, at 64. David asks:

How do arbitrators decide in fact? It is difficult to say. Few awards
are published, and, moreover, arbitrators avoid taking up positions that
would be likely, in the present state of opinion, to result in their award
being invalidated or to jeopardize its execution. Prudence requires them
to refrain from saying plainly that they consider themselves free from such

or such a national system of law.
Id.
See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
38.
opened for signature,June 19, 1980, art. 4(1), 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 2 (application
of the law with which the contract is "most closely connected"); Swiss
Bundesgesetz fiber das Internationale Privatrecht [Federal Statute on Private
International Law] art. 117(1), 1988 I Bundesblatt [BB1] 5 translatedin 37 AM. J.
COMP. L. 193, 223 (1989) (same).
39.
See also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 33(1), second sentence;
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 26(2).
40.
C. PR. CIV. art. 1496 (author's translation).
41.
C6d. Com. art 1445(2).
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enables them to choose the applicable law directly, without the
pretext of resorting to some choice-of-law rule, in order to end up
42
with the rules of decision they like. Provisions of this kind
would seem to authorize arbitrators to choose rules of decision
that are not part of any positive legal system, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 43 In

fact, reported cases show that even without the benefit of such
enabling rules or statutes, arbitral panels have based awards on
the lex mercatoria, and such awards have been judicially
enforced."

V. CUSTOM AND PRIVATE CODIFICATIONS

International arbitral practices are not the only factor
contributing to the evolution of a new law merchant. Customs
developed in international trade and standard terms or
clauses-such as the Incoterms 4 5-found
in international
contracts promote uniform practices that tend to solidify into law.
Indeed, the process of codifying these practices has already
begun.46 By now, thirty-five countries have ratified the Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. 47 Last year an
even more ambitious effort came to fruition: the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) completed
the monumental task of drafting a set of "Principles of

42.
For arbitration rules that authorize the application of non-national law,
see DASSER, supranote 35, at 132-35.
43.
INTERNATIONAL
(UNIDROIT), PRINCIPLES

INSITIUIE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACIS (1994)

[hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES].
44.
See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 22, 1991 (Compania Valenciana de
Cementos Portland SA v. St6. Primary Coal, Inc.), Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 Bull. Civ. I.
No. 1354; Judgment of Dec. 9, 1981 (Banque du Proche-Orient v. Societ6
Fougerolle) Cass. civ. 2e, 1983 D.S. Jur. 235 (decided pursuant to law in effect

before the enactment of C. Pr. Civ. art. 1496 (France)); Judgment of Nov. 18, 1982
(Norsolor), 1984 Y.B. COM. ARB. 161 (Austria); Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in
International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747-8, 756-61
(1985).
45.
See FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 17274 (1992).
46.
See Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization,Restatement, Codification,

and Reform in International Commercial Law, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 683 (1992)
(discussing various ways of giving the lex mercatoriatangible form).
47.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668
(1980).

19951

THE NEWLAW MERCHANT

International Commercial Contracts."48
This transnational
contracts restatement can be expected to command an
intellectual authority that vastly exceeds its ostensibly modest
purpose of providing a stop-gap law49 obligatory only upon
acceptance by the parties or legislatures.
Perhaps the most striking example of a body of rules created
autonomously by merchants that binds world trade more tightly
than any statute could is the International Chamber of
Commerce's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (UCP).5 0 This private endeavor has guided domestic

legislative pens. It has prompted the adoption of non-uniform
versions of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code in several

states, 5 1 and it informs the endeavors of those who are currently
revising this Article.5 2 As Professor James J. White stated, "If one
adopts Justice Holmes' definition of law-what influences
courts-... the UCP are clearly law. "5 3 His observation not only

48.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 43. See MICHAEL JOACHIM BONNELL,
AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW (1994); Joseph M. Perillo,
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text
and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281 (1994); Eason-Weinmann Colloquium on
International and Comparative Law, 3 TuL. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 45 (1995).
49.
The Preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles provides as follows:
These principles set forth general rules for international commercial
contracts.
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by them.
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by "general principles of law," the "lex mercatorid' or
the like.

They may provide a solution to an issue raised when it proves
impossible to establish the relevant rule of the applicable law.

They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform
law instruments.
They may serve as a model for national and international legislators.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supranote 43, at 1.
50.
INTERNAIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993). See generally MATI KURKEIA,
LETTERS OF CREDIT UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: UCC, UCP AND LAW MERCHANT

(1985).
51.

See Christopher Leon, Letters of Credit: A Primer,45 MD. L. REV. 432,

439-40 (1986).
52.
See James G. Barnes, Defining Good Faith Letter of CreditPractices,28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 102 (1994); Donald J. Rapson, Who is Looking Out for the
Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and
Shadows) of ProfessorRubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 270 (1994).
53.
James J. White (unpublished manuscript); see Alaska Textile Co. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 816-17, 822 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1992);
KURKEIA, supranote 50, at 15.
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illustrates the assumption of normative power by private groups,
but also tellingly reveals an inconsistency in Holmes' reasoning.
The exercise of lawmaking power by private interests is of
course at odds with the conventional wisdom, which is rooted in
Austinian notions of positivism. Not surprisingly, the clash of
international practice with a firmly held dogma has fascinated
many legal writers, especially European authors.5 4 But while
numerous books and articles dealing with the newly emerging law
merchant have been published, the subject is rarely discussed in
U.S. conflicts literature. Although the very existence of such a
supranational body of law is still in doubt,5 5 one should expect
that teachers in this field would at least consider-if only to
reject-this possible alternative to the traditional approaches they
advocate.
Yet, with a few exceptions, 5 6 U.S. conflicts
scholars-who, one should think, ought to be well equipped to
deal with the subject of international transactions-tend to avoid
it. One cannot help but wonder whether their neglect reflects a
lack of interest or whether it is instinctive, or perhaps even
deliberate.

54.
For a helpful overview and a guide through the massive literature on
point, see DE LY, supranote 45, at 209-54. European scholars are of course not
the only ones to discuss the phenomenon. See, e.g., OKEZIE CHUKWUMER1JE,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBIRATION (1994); HORACIO A. GRIGERA NAON, CHOICEOF-LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1992); Ranee K.L.
Panjabi, Economic Globalization: The Challenge for Arbitrators, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (1995) (review essay); Ruben Santos Belandro, La Lex
Mercatoria en el Corazon de la Nueva Normativa en Materia de Contrataci6n
Internacional,1995 REVISTA DE DERECHO COMERCIAL Y DE LA EMPRESA (Nos. 61-62)
37 (Uru.).
55.
For references to the lex mercatoria'scritics, see DE LY, supranote 45,
at 219-20 (England); id. at 227-30 (France); id. at 231 (Switzerland); id. at 236-37
(Germany); id. at 239-40 (The Netherlands); id. at 242-45 (Belgium).
56.
Only two U.S. conflicts teachers contributed to an Eason-Weinmann
Colloquium on the subject. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoriaand the
Conflict of Laws, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 213 (Thomas E. Carbonneau
ed. 1990); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lax Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra, at 37. The most recent discussions in U.S.
publications are found in a book and an article by non-experts and in a student
note.
See UGO DRAEITA ET AL., BREACH AND ADAPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEX MERCATORIA (1992); John A. Spanogle, Jr.,

The Arrival of InternationalPrivate Law, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INrL L. & ECON. 477
(1991); Karyn S. Weinberg, Note, Equity in InternationalArbitration: How Fair is
"Fair?,12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 227 (1994). See also Peter Winship, Lax Mercatoriaand
Arbitration: A Discussionof the New Law Merchant,26 INT'L LAW. 850 (1992) (book
review).
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VI. THE NEW LAW MERCHANT: THREAT AND PROMISE

There are, of course, good reasons for the conflicts teachers'
reluctance to discuss the topic. The emergence of a supranational
law undermines the very foundations on which their doctrines
rest-the positivist notions Beale and Currie shared with Justice
Holmes.5 7
Preoccupied with the idea of sovereignty, U.S.
traditionalists find it difficult enough to accept the principle of
party autonomy,5 8 even though it is recognized by most advanced
legal systems.5 9 Those who question the parties' freedom to
choose the law governing their contract are likely to feel even
more uncomfortable about the emergence of rules that owe their
existence to the realities of an international marketplace, rather
than a sovereign's fiat. Such a law is inexplicable in their terms
of reference; its "brooding omnipresence" 60 must be anathema to
those who believe that the raison d'etat must control international
as well as purely domestic transactions. Interest analysts, in
particular, ought to feel uneasy, for what interests are left to
analyze if those that states and nations supposedly harbor do not
matter?
Worse yet, the lex mercatoriathreatens the very existence of
the conflict of laws because once supranational norms emerge,
choice-of-law rules and principles become superfluous.
In
addition, the new law merchant poses a challenge by virtue of its
qualitative superiority. Merchants are, of course, interested in the
quality of the rules that govern their transactions, whereas
unilateralists and multilateralists alike take the position that
substantive considerations should play no role in the choice of the
applicable law. Even if the emerging supranational rules were
confined to commercial matters, 6 1 the internationalization of this
vitally important field should grieve those about whom Ren6
David said:

57.
See supranotes 20-22 and accompanying text.
58.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Patrick J.
Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1995).
59.
See JUENGER, supra note 1, at 55, 219.
60.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
61.
Concerning the prospects of a broader ius gentiurn, see C. WILFRED
JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? 128 (1969); PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW
106-07 (1956); Friedrich K. Juenger, Private InternationalLaw or International
Private Law?, 5 KING'S COLLEGE L.J. 45 (1994); Luther L. McDougal III, "Private
InternationalLaw": lus Gentium Versus Choice of Law Rules or Approaches, 38
AM. J. COMP. L. 521 (1990).
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[Tjhey have the greatest difficulty in conceiving that the theory of
conflict of laws might not be the only suitable method of solving the
problems posed by international legal relations. They cling to this
method, seeking to perpetuate its use even in cases where it is
manifestly
bad: 6 2
they are "conflictualists" not true
"intemationalists."
Yet, whether conflicts scholars like it or not, cases and
statutory authority support the existence of such a law merchant.
To be sure, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 6 3 overruled Swift v. Tyson," the
case in which Justice Story hypothesized the existence of a
supranational commercial law.6 5 However, like the report of Mark
Twain's death, the story of the lex mercatoria's demise is an
exaggeration. Thus, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
66
proclaimed their work product to be a modem law merchant,
whose continued existence Section 1-103 specifically confirms. Of
course, the very idea of a lex mercatoriacarries with it an element
of supranationality. As a North Dakota court explained more
than seventy years ago, the law merchant is a
system of law that does not rest exclusively on the institutions and
local customs of any particular country, but consists of certain
principles of equity and usages of trade which general convenience
and a common sense of justice have established to regulate the
dealings of merchants and 6 mariners
in all the commercial
7
countries of the civilized world.
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 6 8 the landmark
Supreme Court decision that, acknowledging the principle of
party autonomy, upheld the selection of a neutral (and therefore
"disinterested") foreign forum, Chief Justice Burger referred to

62.
David, supra note 32, at 25. Concerning the difficulties choice-of-law
rules pose for arbitrators, see Lando, supranote 44, at 754.
63.
304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a recent critique of this case, see Patrick J.
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction,the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a
Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEx. L. REV. 79 (1993).
64.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
65.
Id. at 19 (stating that "[t]he law respecting negotiable instruments may
be truly declared.., to be in great measure, not the law of a single country only,
but of the commercial world").
66.
According to UCC § 1-105 comment 3, the UCC is a "restatement of
the law merchant and of the understanding of a business community which
transcends state and even national boundaries." Courts still refer to the law
merchant to decide questions left open by the UCC. See, e.g., Pribus v. Bush,
173 Cal. Rptr. 747, 749 (1981).
67.
Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508 (1924). See also Alaska
Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 816 (letters of credit
governed by the lex mercatoria); U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 2 (1987); Lando, supra note
44, at 752.
68.
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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"ancient concepts of freedom of contract 69 and characterized the
maritime towing contract at bar as a "freely negotiated private
international commercial agreement." 70 This language, as well as
the Chief Justice's criticism of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals'
insistence "on a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts,"7 1 suggests the
Court's awareness of the need for a separate set of rules to govern
international, as opposed to purely domestic, transactions.
The same awareness informs United States treaty practice.
By ratifying the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, the United States implicitly recognized the desirability of

emancipating the rules governing transnational sales agreements
from the vagaries of state laws. That very realization also inspired
the choice-of-law rules for international contracts the United
States negotiated last year with other members of the
Organization of American States. Article 9 of the Inter-American
72
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts
provides as follows:
If the parties have not selected the applicable law, or if their
selection proves ineffective, the contract shall be governed by the
law of the State with which it has the closest ties.
The Court will take into account all objective and subjective
elements of the contract to determine the law of the State with
which it has the closest ties. It shall also take into account the
commercial law recognized by
general principles of international
73
international organizations.

VII. CONCLUSION
As is apparent, important international trends contradict the
conventional conflicts law wisdom, which is rooted in the notion
of sovereignty. These trends are of particular importance at a
time when U.S. conflicts literature has become thoroughly insular
because, as Max Rheinstein once predicted, the scholars' fixation
on sovereignty and governmental interests has led us into a dead-

Id. at 11.
69.
Id. at 16.
70.
Id. at 9.
71.
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
72.
Contracts, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.K/XXI.5 (Mar. 17, 1994), reprintedin33 I.L.M. 733.

73.

Id. at 735. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on

the Law Applicable to International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons,
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 391 (1994) (discussing the genesis and import of this
provision).
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end alley. 74 The current parochialism is all the more deplorable
considering that, since Story's days, an urbane and comparativist
stance characterized the U.S. conflict of laws. Even Joseph Beale,
the First Restatement's much maligned reporter, who purported
to spealc only for the common law, 75 paid due attention to foreign
developments.7 6 However, when Currie dethroned Beale, most
U.S. teachers abandoned the effort to offer their students a
"window on the legal world."77 Out of touch and out of tune with
the rest of the globe, U.S. conflicts scholarship has become
myopic; the task of informing students about what is going on
outside the United States has fallen to those who teach
international business transactions.
To be sure, playing the games that conflicts scholars have
played throughout the ages offers much titillation. Speculative
minds like to ponder such questions as whether statutes are real
or personal, where rights vest or legal relationships sit, what
policies a sovereign wishes to pursue and what his interests may
be, or how one should deal with the dreaded renvoi, true conflicts,
unprovided-for cases and similar figments of the legal
imagination. Engrossed in such whimsy, scholars tend to forget
the great wide world outside their studies; instead of observing
important international phenomena, they dedicate themselves to
such obsolete home-spun problems as guest statutes" and
79
slavery cases.
From its invention in the Middle Ages, 8 0 the conflict of laws

has been encumbered with scholasticism, which may explain its
imperviousness to common sense and substantive values.
Preoccupied as they may be with playing mind games and having
angels dance on the head of a pin, law teachers can, however,
hardly afford to overlook the lex mercatoria, if only because law
graduates are bound to encounter it in practice. To withhold from
their students information about this burgeoning new field of law,
and the possibility of a different-arguably more sensible-approach
to the resolution of multistate problems comes close to educational

74.
Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 632,
633 (1962).
75.
See 1 BEALE, supranote 12, at 12, 51-52.
76.
See 3 BEALE, supra note 9, at 1879-1975. See also JOSEPH H. BEALE,
BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1914).
77.
WILLIS L. M. REESE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 3

(9th ed. 1990).
78.
See ROGER C. CRAMTON ETAL., CONFLICT OF LAWS vi (5th ed. 1993).
79.
See Harold W. Horowitz, Choice-of-Law Decisions Involving Slavery:
'Interest Analysis" in the Early Nineteenth Century, 17 UCLA L. REV. 587 (1987);
Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 74 (1971).

80.

See JUENGER, supra note 1, at 10-16.
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malpractice. At the very least, those who publish treatises and
casebooks ought to refer their readers to the literature about the
Once the professors pay attention to this
law merchant.
conflicts scholarship may begin to
phenomenon,
important
spirit. Heeding Yogi Berra's sage
urbaner
and
breathe a saner
a
advice that "you can observe lot just by watching" may save the
field from the mortal danger of becoming irrelevant. 8 '

81.
1030-31.

Concerning this danger, see Sterk, supra note 5, at 951-52, 987, 992,

